Carnegie: Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel will not achieve peace and...

London – “Al-Quds Al-Arabi”:

In an article published by the Carnegie Endowment website, researcher Yasmine Farouk wondered what would happen if Israel and Saudi Arabia decided to normalize relations between them.

Farouk said that the administration of President Donald Trump is pressing Saudi Arabia to join the Arab countries that have established relations with Israel, but that Riyadh may not respond to these pressures.

There is a slow turnaround toward Israel, as the Saudi press, clerics and princes have backed the agreements signed last month by the UAE and Bahrain with Israel. The latest hints came from the most famous Saudi ambassador to Washington, Bandar bin Sultan, through a series of television interviews and his own website, although King Salman’s speech on September 23, 2020 before the General Assembly showed a traditional stance.

The last statements were from the king and Saudi officials, who set conditions and standards based on the Arab peace plan and international resolutions. Farouk says that establishing formal relations will help both countries achieve a number of strategic and military goals.

And when Saudi Arabia and Israel decide on normalization, it will not be transformative in the degree that each side aspires to. In fact, the transformation may not fulfill their desires. The author presents six goals that advocates for normalization believe will be achieved, even though there are opposites standing in the way.

First, normalization will not encourage peace and stability in the region. Advocates for Gulf-Israeli normalization say that diplomatic relations will bring peace to a region without peace. However, the recent normalization agreements, including a possible Saudi-Israeli agreement, will not address the “main weakness” that causes violence and instability in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories.

In the past decade, the region has witnessed protests against oppressive regimes, including Saudi Arabia, Israel and Palestine. Most of these protests were followed by state repression, and in some cases civil wars and external interference. But the injustice and inequality that prompted the protests was never addressed, with the exception of Tunisia.

Despite the appearance of peace given by the recent peace and normalization agreements, Saudi Arabia expects the United States and Israel to strengthen security and military cooperation.

In order to defend itself against Iran, Saudi Arabia may benefit from new cooperation with Israel and its experience in irregular wars. However, the record of Saudi Arabia and Israel is problematic with regard to the treatment of civilians. That is why cooperation will not bring peace.

As for the second matter, normalization will not always serve America’s interests in the Middle East. The reason is that Saudi Arabia and Israel want America to intervene outside its jurisdiction. Likewise, the interests of the two countries are not always compatible with the US interests, but rather overlap with them. Both are keen on the continued US military hegemony over the region, and therefore it is not in their interest for America to withdraw from it.

The two countries want Washington to use its military power to defeat, not contain, Iran. You are pushing for an impossible deal that does not serve American interests in stopping the Iranian nuclear project, but by pursuing Iran’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia and Israel want America to remain in the fight against terrorism, but electronic warfare and espionage operations mean that their definition of terrorism includes peaceful opponents who oppose normalization.

The expansion of the war on terror complicates US policy to pursue interstate rivalries and other issues that politics has neglected. Saudi Arabia and Israel have expanded their ties with America’s rivals such as China and Russia. Although expansion is economic, cooperation is not always transparent, and there is a possibility that it affects security and military cooperation. By encouraging normalization, the United States aspires to redistribute the security and defense burden and establish a regional network capable of defending itself, but neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel, with the support of the UAE, has the security framework that America thinks about. The distrust stemming from generational changes and competition means that these countries do not agree on the appropriate way to confront Iran.

The third point is that normalization will not promote moderation and liberalism in Saudi Arabia. There is evidence that Saudi citizens are with the normalization that is presented in the narration that the Kingdom has become moderate. This fits with Mohammed bin Salman’s approach to “shock therapy” and gives his rivals and the West a signal that he will adopt any modernization policy for his country.

But the social players in Saudi Arabia did not demand normalization with Israel to the extent that they called for reforms such as empowering women and combating corruption. More than this, Palestine is not a marginal issue. Rather, it is a subject of discussion and mobilization in schools, lecture halls, NGOs, and mosques, including the Grand Mosque.

And normalization sponsored by Trump, means the transfer of the “Saudi of tomorrow” is a completely exaggerated shift, like Nicki Minaj’s invitation to sing in the land of the Two Holy Mosques. It is something that cannot be tolerated by the value system that the Saudi majority believes in.

Such action will strip confidence from issues of socio-economic and religious development, and feed the extremist narrative of Mohammed bin Salman’s reforms, which are directed against Islam.

The scramble for normalization with Israel will affect the kingdom’s rhetoric of moderation. Saudi citizens will see the Imam of the Temple Mount supporting the normalization agreements, at a time when legitimate Palestinian voices are being suppressed. The public opinion is not blind to discover the contradiction in the Saudi discourse. Until recently, the Saudi press and princes attacked Turkey and Qatar for their relationship with Israel.

Similarly, not all voices denouncing the Palestinians and placing them in the same anti-Saudi camp as Iran, Turkey and Qatar do not accept that Israel is a friend because it is an enemy of my enemy. Saudi-Israeli relations will remain a charge of the royal family’s accounts of their survival. And every time the Israeli army acts cruelly against the Palestinians, popular sympathy forces the ruling family to respond, even if only symbolically.

The fourth thing is that peace will not be warm. Normalization does not mean that the two countries have become friends. It is true that a crowd of writers, the media, social media accounts and sheikhs talked about that Israel is not the enemy, but the Palestinians, called “the ungrateful Arabs of the North” who stood before Saudi Arabia to think of its interests first.

However, this talk stems from a campaign to strengthen the Saudi identity at the expense of the Arab and Islamic identity. There is no evidence that this identity is supported by all Saudis. And because the authorities have dominated the social media scene during the past years, and we have not tolerated any criticism, that means suspicion of any narrative, especially regarding the attitudes of young people.

The Zogby Center confirmed the unpopularity of normalization among Saudi citizens. The government must suppress any mobilization against him. The security and cyber cooperation between Riyadh and Tel Aviv also gives the Saudis a bet on this, because the cooperation gave the government power to monitor them. For this reason, the Imam of the Mosque reminded citizens of obedience to the ruler and the necessity to leave politics to him.

The fifth thing is that normalization will not solve Saudi Arabia’s problems in Washington. Historically, Israel has been the main source of opposition to strong relations with Saudi Arabia, despite the kingdom’s influential presence within American policy circles.

Today, there is a misunderstanding that links Saudi Arabia’s problems with the democratic bias against the kingdom. This talk goes beyond the complexities of American policy and the Saudi position, which overlaps with domestic interests and foreign policy, such as investing in domestic, not foreign, military bases, restoring American global leadership, and balancing America’s liberal values ​​with its interests abroad. These matters have an impact on US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel.

The sixth thing is that normalization will not help in Saudi domestic political issues. The Saudi crown prince may have wanted a price other than the high price of normalization, which is a Palestinian state. Rather, he may have wanted American assistance to him to confront the enemies he made on his way to the top, not only in Saudi Arabia, but in America.

This American support for Saudi Arabia is not impossible, but conditions must be fulfilled, including Trump winning the elections, not the Democratic candidate, Joseph Biden.

Understandably, the United States and Israel are keen on normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia. But haste means Riyadh losing its power and position in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia’s power does not stem from the economy but from an acceptance of its influence and ability to build trends outside its borders and spend money on its traditional bases.

When its policies attract popular public opinion, its influence is doubled. Therefore, it is not in the interest of Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh to rush towards policies that lead to challenging the leadership of Saudi Arabia and Islam and its local status.

This will not affect Saudi Arabia’s ability to gain access to hostile forces and non-state players. They will waste Saudi Arabia’s ability to lead Arab and Muslim majority countries to normalize relations with Israel when the time is right.