Turkey’s preemptive war

Since the battles of Tovuz on July 12 last between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which took place near the area through which the famous Azerbaijan-Georgian-Turkish pipeline passes Baku-Ceyhan, Ankara and Baku may have realized the seriousness of these battles and their oil implications. Since that time, reports have been circulating of a joint Azerbaijani-Turkish mobilization to confront the Russian-backed Armenian threat. So the ground and air maneuvers were repeated in Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan between the Turkish and Azerbaijani armies. And Azerbaijani military units participated in Turkish naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean recently.And there were many reports that hundreds, perhaps thousands of Syrians, in Idlib and Afrin, belonging to the “Sultan Murad Brigades” and others, went to Azerbaijan for salaries ranging from 500 to 2000 dollars. In fact, pictures, recordings and videos of them were published while they were in Azerbaijan. They have turned into what looks like a “parallel army” of the Turkish army that uses subdued demand wherever Ankara needs it, from Syria to Libya, and today in the Caucasus. But the irony is that these “jihadists” do not like fighting, according to records attributed to them that were published in Turkish media, along with the Azeris “infidel Shiites.” But the use of these undoubtedly raises Russia’s chagrin, which makes them accept the task.
Higher military meetings were continuing between Turkish and Azerbaijan officials. In the period immediately following the Tovuz battles, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have been in the process of adding a new “achievement” to him after he became entrenched in the presence of his forces in Syria and after his advance on the Libyan front, and then raised the voice and grip of the European Union in Greece and Greek Cyprus, and in a move to transform “Hagia Sophia” to a mosque. But apparently, the Turkish plan did not match the al-Baydar account. Instead of accumulating achievements, Turkey found itself on the defensive:
1- Russian pressure on Turkey to withdraw some Turkish observation points in Idlib and the Russian-Syrian raids on terrorist sites in Idlib, with a Turkish willingness to fulfill the Russian request in exchange for giving Turkey the areas of Manbij and Tal Rifaat and their vicinity, which Russia refused.
2- The situation in Libya changed after the warning of the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and the stopping of the Turkish progress at the Sirte-Jafra line, and then the start of discussions between the Libyan parties according to the Egyptian perception, and the most important thing is the announcement by the Prime Minister of Tripoli, Fayez al-Sarraj, that he would give up his position at the end of October Next October, and what this represents in terms of Turkey losing its first man there, and what the coming developments can bear in terms of an additional decline in the Turkish role.

The Azerbaijani-Turkish desire to move the situation was evident in its complete readiness

3- The tensions in the eastern Mediterranean have reached an unprecedented height with Turkey’s insistence on exploration and work in marine areas that Greece considers to be its subsidiaries. Turkey kept pace with the tension with the “Mediterranean storm” maneuvers with Turkish Cyprus and others in which Azerbaijan participated, with great significance, for the first time. However, the European reaction was strong and threatened to impose harsh sanctions on Turkey at the Brussels summit, which was scheduled to take place on September 24 and 25, but was postponed until next Thursday. The threat of sanctions was followed by a Turkish tactical move to withdraw the exploration vessel “Yavuz” from the Greek island of Mejis, which is very close to the Turkish coast. The move was considered a freezing of tension and opened the door for communication between the Turkish and French presidents, Emmanuel Macron.

What does Turkey want?
1- The Azerbaijani-Turkish preparations have shifted from seeking a new achievement that accumulates what preceded, to an attempt to compensate for the above, and to prepare for an attack that would float the image of “strong Turkey”, not declining. The acceleration was to open the current battle with Armenia in the southern regions of Karabakh (Artsakh) and close to the Iranian borders. What supports this thinking is that the relatively stable status quo does not harm the situation of Armenia or its entrenchment, and it is not in their interest to change it except in the direction of extracting international recognition of the right to entrenched self-determination, and this is not currently on the table. Restoring Turkey’s strong image was accompanied by Erdogan’s media, calling for bombing Yerevan “by mistake” with a missile and declaring that war is the only way to solve the issue radically.
2- Likewise, the Azerbaijani-Turkish desire to move the situation was evident in the full and planned readiness of the Azerbaijani army, which moved immediately and from the first moment to announce the start of the battles, to attack and control many important villages and hills as well as roads in areas in Karabakh, before That the Armenian army takes back part of it, according to news agencies. The Azerbaijani army also bombarded the capital of Artsakh Stepanakrd with several missiles.
3- In addition to restoring Turkey’s strong image, any tension in the Caucasus situation confuses Russia, which for centuries considers the region its backyard and has excellent relations with the two parties to the conflict; Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey wants to put pressure on Russia, first in response to Russian pressure on Turkey in Syria, and secondly to Turkey’s dissatisfaction with Russia’s neutral position regarding the Turkish conflict with Greece and in the eastern Mediterranean.
4- Likewise, the high Turkish threats, yesterday, Monday, by Erdogan against Armenia, and the call to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan, meaning to return to the roots of the issue, and the threat also to join Azerbaijan in the battle – is also a pre-emption for the meeting of the European Union after tomorrow, Thursday, and preventing any issuance Sanctions on Turkey, on the basis of stopping sanctions in exchange for an end to tension in the Caucasus.
5- Turkish observers also indicate that Turkey has become a strong competitor to Israel to sell weapons to Azerbaijan, especially the surveillance planes from afar and drones that have proven effective in Libya. The emerging new tension is pushing Azerbaijan to go ahead with the purchase of Turkish weapons, which explains part of raising the Turkish voice on the side of Azerbaijan and repeating the slogan “one nation in two states”, with Turkey’s prior knowledge that entering the war directly is an internationally unacceptable adventure and opens up to great risks for the Turkey itself and on its relations with Russia and the European Union.

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